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WHAT’S IN THE CLOUD? - AN
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF
CLOUD STORAGE USAGE ON THE
BROWSER CACHE
Graeme Horsman
Teesside University
g.horsman@tees.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Cloud storage is now a well established and popular service adopted by many individuals and
organizations, often at a scaled cost, with free accounts also available. It provides users with
the ability to store content on a cloud service provider’s infrastructure, offering the benefit of
redundancy, reliability, security, the flexibility of access, and the potential assumed the liability
of the provider for data loss within the contexts of a licensing agreement. Consequently, this
form of remote storage provides a regulatory challenge as content which once resided upon
a seized digital exhibit, available for scrutiny during a digital forensic investigatory, may
no longer be present where attempting to acquire access to it creates costing and juridical
difficulties. This article offers a digital forensic examination of trace-evidence left in the
Internet browser cache following cloud storage account usage and interaction. Following
interactions with Dropbox and Google Drive in the Chrome browser, testing demonstrates
the possibility to recover data capable of facilitating a partial reconstruction of a user’s cloud
storage account, with results offered and contextualized.
Keywords: Digital Forensics, Cloud Storage, Investigation, Cache, Dropbox, Google Drive
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is now revolutionizing the
way individuals create, access, and store dig-
ital content (Ruan et al., 2011). The ’Cloud’
(a term often used to encapsulate all cloud
technology service variants) is multifaceted,
with options available to the user which range
from simple storage facilities, to access to
specialist software and hardware platforms
(Birk et al., 2011). While an in-depth dis-
cussion of cloud technologies is beyond the
scope of this work (see Hayes (2008); Mell
and Grance, (2011); Ruparelia, (2016); for a
dialogue on this content), defining the Cloud
and its coverage is necessary despite not be-
ing straightforward due to its multiple areas
of coverage, of which attention is drawn to-
ward Mell, and Grance’s (2011 p.3) proposed
interpretation.
"Cloud computing is a model for enabling
ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of configurable com-
puting resources (e.g., networks, servers, stor-
age, applications, and services) that can be
rapidly provisioned and released with min-
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imal management effort or service provider
interaction." (Mell and Grance, 2011 p.3)
One of the many benefits offered by cloud
service providers is the ability for users to
store their digital content within a Cloud
infrastructure, which has even seen law en-
forcement utilize such platforms to store large
quantities of video footage generated as part
of their investigations, for later review (Mi-
crosoft, 2016). This is typically referred to as
’cloud storage’ where currently, a reported 1.9
billion consumers to have accounts (Statista,
2018c). While forms of a local digital data
storage continue to play an important role
in the configuration of many computing and
mobile systems (a position which is unlikely
to drastically change in the immediate fu-
ture), there are now many cost-effective (in
some cases, free) cloud service provider op-
tions available for a user who wishes to place
their data beyond the confines of their cur-
rent device’s local storage facilities. In doing
so, the user acquires the benefit of redun-
dancy, reliability, security, flexibility of ac-
cess, and the potential assumed liability of
the provider for data loss within the contexts
of a licensing agreement. Consequently, due
to its increasing popularity of using this form
of remote data storage creates a regulatory
concern, particularly for those involved in the
investigation of digital offenses.
Typically, a ‘traditional’ DF investigation
commences with an examination of lawfully
seized digital devices and any form of digital
storage media which they contain. Prior to
cloud technologies, an examination of locally
resident content would arguably often result
in the ability to determine the way in which
a user has interacted with their device and
what content they possess, or have created
and interacted with. Yet, despite increases
in storage media capacities, which are also
now more affordable, non-local cloud storage
facilities offer an alternative and popular op-
tion for robust and secure storage of personal
data. Currently, it is estimated that approxi-
mately 3.6 billion users utilize cloud storage
services in 2018 (Statista, 2018a), with Drop-
box alone claiming 500 million users in 2016
(Dropbox, 2016). While cloud storage main-
tains many clear benefits for the user, such
platforms are abused (Choo and Dehghan-
tanha, 2016), where those tasked with investi-
gating such events are posed with a number of
investigatory challenges. Those who choose
to implement cloud technology as part of any
suspected offense create an issue for those
tasked with investigating a suspected offense
(Grispos et al., 2012; Zargari and Benford,
2012; Thethi and Keane, 2014), where Dyk-
stra and Sherman (2011, p47) note, cloud
storage may be used as an ’an accessory to a
crime’.
Acknowledgment of the potential for abus-
ing cloud storage technology has long been
noted (BBC News, 2011). Any form of re-
mote storage beyond the direct access and
scrutiny of law enforcement arguably creates
regulatory concerns. As a result, attention
is placed on the provider and any mecha-
nisms in place designed to detect abuse of
their services. In reality, this is an impossible
task, and although service provider agree-
ments make users concede not to utilize their
cloud technology for illegal acts, there are
those who seek to misuse these services where
prohibiting these acts is difficult. While pro-
tocols to identify known or notable files may
be in place, beyond the knowledge of the user,
obfuscation of key files via encryption prior to
upload would likely render the provider pow-
erless to detect that illegal content is being
stored by a user. One of the main concerns of
cloud storage providers is the ability to store
images depicting child sexual abuse (IDCSA)
(Europol, 2014) with cloud storage reportedly
being utilized to store and share IDCSA on a
number of occasions (BBC News, 2013; BBC
News, 2017; O’Connell, 2018).
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This article offers a forensic examination
of the impact of cloud storage usage via an
Internet browser on the cache to identify
the existence and interpretation of digital
trace evidence to support law enforcement
investigations. Section 2 provides a discus-
sion surrounding the challenges posed by the
Cloud, where Section 3 presents an examina-
tion of the browser cache following Dropbox
usage with Section 4, examining the impact
of Google Drive on the browser cache. Finally,
conclusions are drawn.
2. PROBLEMS WITH
THE CLOUD
Anyone involved in criminal acts where li-
ability will ensue if illegal content is found
within their possession will likely view cloud
storage as a method of protecting themselves
by storing content in a place that may not
be easily identified. One of the fundamental
issues that cloud storage facilities provide is
a lack of direct and immediate physical ac-
cess to content (Dykstra and Sherman, 2012;
Zawoad and Hasan, 2013; Simou et al., 2014),
where different challenges are encountered de-
pending on the service model which is imple-
mented by the user (Alqahtany et al., 2015).
In the context of a user who has access to
a cloud storage facility, digital data which
formerly resided on a local device may no
longer be present following its transfer to the
Cloud and any further accesses to it might oc-
cur remotely through a cloud storage portal
(browser-based or mobile application, etc.).
Further, traces of any digital data prior to
it being moved to the Cloud may no longer
be available on a local device. In each case
the challenge of any forensic investigation
where a cloud storage account has been used
is twofold; first, identifying that a cloud stor-
age service is being used by a suspect and
second, identifying what is in there in order
to ascertain potential accountability for crim-
inal acts (Zawoad and Hasan, 2012; Quick et
al., 2013; Daryabar et al., 2017). A concern
exists that it may not be possible for an in-
vestigating practitioner to establish either of
these points following a forensic examination
of any seized devices.
2.1 Access to the Cloud
Assuming that a DF practitioner can identify
that a suspect has operated a cloud storage
account, they may seek (with appropriate
guidance and authority as part of an investi-
gation) to examine content stored within it.
To achieve this, they may attempt to acquire
credentials to access a cloud account (either
from a seized device or suspect, accompa-
nied by relevant legal authority) or seek legal
disclosure of account information from the
provider directly. Such processes can be time-
consuming, expensive, and have varying rates
of success due to procedural irregularities or
non-compliance (Dykstra and Sherman, 2011;
Marturana et al., 2012). Figure 1 provides a
high-level overview of the decisions involved
in the investigation of a cloud storage account
believed to be involved in a suspect offense.
There are three investigatory paths to pro-
ceed with acquiring access to a cloud stor-
age account. The first follows a request di-
rectly to the cloud service provider following
the correct disclosure requirements have been
met, accompanied by the necessary legal au-
thority. Procedural requirements are often
defined within a provider’s terms and con-
ditions and legal guidance, which is often
supplied on their websites. In some cases,
a law enforcement portal is available specifi-
cally for request purposes. Following a sub-
mission request, the provider determines its
validity taking into account their licensing
agreements and operational arrangements be-
fore deciding whether to make an account in-
formation disclosure. Where a provider exists
beyond the jurisdiction in which the current
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Figure 1. The high-level stages involved dur-
ing an investigation involving a suspected
cloud storage account.
investigation is taking place, difficulties can
arise due to, in some cases, a lack of legal
enforcement issues and compliance. While
a disclosure request is likely to be the main
option for obtaining a complete depiction of
a suspect’s cloud storage account, the timely
cooperation by a service provider along with
procedural efficiencies and costs has raised
concerns (James and Gladyshev, 2016; Par-
liamentary Office of Science and Technology,
2016; Casey et al., 2018).
Second, a suspect may choose to self-
disclose the content of their accounts or pro-
vide access to it. Subject to requisite legal
authority to access and utilized such disclosed
content, the practitioner may be able to ex-
tract and examine content within cloud stor-
age. Finally, following an investigation of any
of a suspect’s seized items (computer, mobile
device, etc.) it may be possible to extract
cloud storage account credentials and utilize
them to attain a remote login to the cloud
storage account (see tools such as Magnet
AXIOM Cloud) (Martini et al., 2016). Again,
while the required legal authority is needed,
this option provides potentially the quickest
access to a suspect account. While this op-
tion may offer a quicker route to accessing
a cloud account, providers can update and
change the way their service operates, pre-
venting such methods from being forensically
exploited.
Despite these three options being available
to law enforcement, prior to any stages in-
volved with securing access to the account,
those involved must first have some form of
reasonable grounds first to suspect that cloud
storage facilities have been used as part of
an offense, and second, maintain some indi-
cation as to what they expect to be stored
within the account or how they believe it
has been used. Access to a cloud account
can be a resource-intensive process. There-
fore a decision to pursue access should be
made following information which provides
some form of reasonable suspicion that con-
tent within it will be of evidentiary value to
a current investigation. While legal require-
ments differ between jurisdictions and ser-
vice providers, typically, such requirements
are in place to prevent unnecessary privacy
breached and collateral intrusion. In the UK,
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
2000 provides the power to compel suspects
to disclose their passwords (see RIPA section
49), with the recent case of Stephen Nichol-
son demonstrating prosecution for failing to
provide access to his Facebook account (Sky
News, 2018). Such methods may be seen as
a way to potentially circumvent the difficul-
ties associated with seeking disclosure from
a service provider.
Given the issues noted previously in sec-
tions 1 and 2, establishing such evidence-
of-use may be an issue. In the last eight
years, academic literature has focused on
documenting the forensic challenges posed
by cloud platforms (see, for example, Amin-
nezhad et al., 2013), but minimal attention
to the browser cache has been paid.
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2.2 The Cache
Providing private modes have not been uti-
lized, the Internet browser cache on most
mainstream browsing applications provides
an insight into the content hosted on the
sites visited by the user. The browser cache
is frequently acknowledged but rarely the
sole focus of digital forensics research (see
Horsman, 2018a; 2018b for some examples
of cache-focused work). In the context of
the Cloud, this is also often the case, where
for example Malik et al., (2015) focus on
cloud storage application artifacts omitting
an analysis of the cached content from basic
browser-based interaction with a cloud stor-
age account, which can be a potential source
of content cached from a result of their visit
and interaction with their storage account.
Section 3 and 4 demonstrates the potential
value of the browser cache as part of an in-
vestigation into cloud storage usage.
3. METHODOLOGY
The testing undertaken followed the Frame-
work for Reliable Experimental Design
(FRED) research model (Horsman, 2018c).
All testing carried out within this article was
completed using test Dropbox and Google
Drive accounts with uniquely identifiable
data (both in terms of content; pre-hashed
for identification purposes, and filename)
to examine account usage behaviors in the
cache. Interaction with these accounts was
carried out on a clean install of the Win-
dows 10 operating system with logins and
access to the cloud storage accounts under-
taken through the Chrome Internet browser
(version 67.0.3396.99) due it its reported dom-
inant share of the market in terms of users.
Subsequent analysis of the Chrome cache fol-
lowing cloud storage account activity was
carried out utilizing Nirsoft’s (2018) ‘Chrome-
CacheView v1.77’, a cache parsing applica-
tion. Testing was iterative, examining indi-
vidual account actions, then repeating test
results for reliability purposes.
3.1 Dropbox
This section explores the impact on the Inter-
net browser cache following user interaction
with a Dropbox cloud storage account.
3.1.1 Dropbox ‘On-Landing’:-
Account Metadata
An examination of the cache following land-
ing on the www.dropbox.com site, the www.
dropbox.com.html file is of interest (see Fig-
ure 2). Here, details of the cached site HTML
structure is available for query. While this
file does not render when placed back into the
browser window itself allowing a visual inspec-
tion of the site’s elements (a typical process
implemented in forensic investigations in or-
der to force the browser to re-render a cached
site’s architecture), its internal HTML code
can still support the identification of Drop-
box content when a user has viewed their
account online using Chrome.
Figure 2. Chrome cache content following a
visit to www.dropbox.com.
To commence, following an examination
of the \$www.dropbox.com.html\$ file and
its contents (an example content is cap-
tured and provided below for reference), the
"PAGE_LOAD_TIME": tag entry denotes a
UNIX Epoch timestamp which following test-
ing indicates the time the page was last
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loaded. Following a live examination of the
Dropbox homepage source code indicates this
value is also updated when the page is re-
freshed. Therefore the value reflects a ’last
load time,’ which could be either an initial
visit or page refresh. In the case of the for-
mer, this time may be cross-referenceable
against Internet history timestamp informa-
tion if present. As a result, this time stamp
allows a practitioner to determine what files
were in the Dropbox account at a given time,
taking into account the information discussed
in the following sections of this article.
Also, data contained in the { "LOCALE:̈}
parenthesis depicts metadata surrounding
the account, which has been accessed
through the web browser (shown below).
The display_name¨: tag value reflects the
’Name’ value assigned to the account (de-
fined by the account holder during sign-
up). The "id¨: tag value provides an ac-
count identifier, which can also be attributed
to account activity (see Section 3.1.2 for
further details). The "email¨: tag value
provides the email address of the account
signed in during the Dropbox session, and
the "photo_circle_url¨: tag value con-
tains the URL for the profile picture assigned
to the account. A third party can access this
URL to display the image if it remains hosted
on the Dropbox servers. If no profile image
has been set, this value is set to NULL.
\{\"LOCALE\": \"GB\", \"prompt_ha_hidi
ng\": true, \"_viewer_properties\": {\
"display_name\": \"GREY JOY\", \"can_
moderate_comments\": false, \"deprecat
ed_first_user_in_the_cookie_id\": 778
37232, \"is_reseller_session\": false
, \"is_team_assume_user_session\": fa
lse, \"is_assume_user_session\": fals
e, \"_user_data\": [\{"initials_url\":
\"https://ac.dropboxstatic.com/accoun
t_photo/get_initials?initials=GJ\\u00
26size=128x128\\u0026vers=0\", \"user
_root_permissions\": \"edit\", \"has_
never_set_password\": false, \"id\": 7
7837232, \"sso_required\": false, \"di
splay_name\": \"Grey Joy\", \"_authed\
": true, \"home_ns_id\": 126648836, \"
lname\": \"JOY\", \"role\": \"personal
\", \"is_email_verified\": true, \"fna
me\": \"GREY\", \"cdm_path\": \"\", \"
email\": \"grey.joy@googlemail.com\",
\"is_paper_disabled\": false, \"accoun
t_id\": \"dbid:AAAAz7mAv7FTO-BYzKWNpC
1uj3FaJ1wVfBA\", \"is_cdm_member\": f
alse, \"nid\": \"01529833775757704936
\", \"is_dropbox_admin\": false, \"pai
d\": 0, \"root_ns_id\": 126648836, \"p
hoto_url\": null, \"is_team_admin\": f
alse, \"familiar_name\": \"GREY\", \"is
_team\": false, \"photo_circle_url\":
"https://dl-web.dropbox.com/account_pho
to/get/dbaphid\%3AAACJ-_rJyCoDzFXXbB8MD
aBqtStmlN-pZdY?circle_crop=1\\u0026size
=128x128\\u0026vers=1530383091362\"\}]\
}, \"DEFAULT_ROOT_NAME\": \"Dropbox\",
\"PERSONAL_ROLE_STRING\": \"Personal\"}
\}
3.1.2 Home Screen Activity
The www.dropbox.com.htm file also main-
tains structural information regarding the
Dropbox web pages visited by a user, with the
starting point for analysis being the Dropbox
‘Homepage’. The Dropbox ‘Homepage’ main-
tains by default a list of the 10 most recent
activities undertaken by the user. However,
this list does offer a user the chance to ex-
pand this view. Figure 3 provides an example
of the Dropbox Homepage, where key page
artifacts have been highlighted. This demon-
strates how this data are presented in the
www.dropbox.com.html file and the mean-
ing of associated metadata retained.
Every single entry on the ‘Recent’ list on
the Dropbox homepage is structured within
the www.dropbox.com.html file as follows:-
"recent_activities\": [{\"when_milli\
Page 6 c© 2020 JDFSL
What’s in the Cloud? JDFSL V15N1
Figure 3. The Dropbox ‘Home’ screen show-
ing recent user activity.
": 1530296324000.0, \"resource_id\":
\"id:WftHZCn1cXAAAAAAAAACXg\",\"rela
ted_activity_keys\":[\"RmlsZUFjdGl2aX
R5OldmdEhaQ24xY1hBQUFBQUFBQUFDWGc6Zml
sZV9vYmpfa2V5\"], \"iewing_user\": {
\"id\": 77837232}, \"recent_event_ty
pe\": 0, \"activity_key\":\"UmVjZW50
QWN0aXZpdHk6MDoxNTMwMjk2MzI0LjA6Yjgz
ZWIyZTY4MjA4YTUxODQyMjYxMmVlNjM5YzYw
ZmQ\",\"id_type\":\"ENCODED_FILE_OBJ
_ID\",\"activity_data\": {\"home_dis
play_type\": \"FILE\"}, \"skeleton_
data\":{\"context_display_name\":\"P
ersonal\",\"context_display_path\":\"\
",\"filter_types_by_key\":{\"RmlsZUFj
dGl2aXR5OldmdEhaQ24xY1hBQUFBQUFBQUFDW
Gc6ZmlsZV9vYmpfa2V5\": 1}, \"display_
name\": \"Scre-en Shot 2018-05-19 at
21.12.40.png\",\"icon\": \"page_whit
e_picture\"}\}]
The "when_milli¨ timestamp reflects the
‘informal’ value displayed to the user. For
example, in Figure 3 where Fig 4.png is
shown to have been opened ’1 minute ago’,
the "when_milli¨ UNIX Epoch timestamp
when converted depicts the actual time
stamp. Whenever an entry on the Recent
list is interacted with (a file/folder is opened,
viewed, etc.), this timestamp is dynamic and
updates to reflect the time of this interaction,
therefore depending on the time that the
www.dropbox.com.html file is cached by
the browser, further accesses may have
occurred but not have been reflected in
the cached data. The "activity_key¨ is a
Base64 encoded value which when decoded is
typically formatted as follows - RecentActiv-
ity:9:1530369097.0:b83eb2e68208a518422612
ee639c60fd. Following testing, the Recen-
tActivity timestamp was shown to be
the same as "when_milli¨ timestamp.
Although there appears to be a hash-type
alphanumeric string (seemingly of structure
type MD5) value, this value changes when
the same file (identical, verified by hash) is
uploaded and when file names are changed
and therefore testing suggests this value
cannot be used as a unique identifier for
the file which has been accessed on the
account. The "viewing_user:̈ value
corresponds to the account ID (shown in
section 3.1.1 regarding account metadata).
The "home_display_type¨: value indicates
the type of artifact where FILE indicates
a stored file, and SHARED/_FOLDER
indicates a shared folder item.
Finally, the d̈isplay_name¨: value corre-
sponds to the file/folder name shown to the
user, which has been assigned to the file when
uploaded.
If the user expands a Recent event which
contains one or more files (typically images,
see for example in Figure 3 where 2 images
are stated indicating two images are stored
within an expandable menu), a 100*100 pre-
view image will be displayed to the user of
each file (see Figure 4). Following testing,
when a user expands these menus within
their browser window, these preview images
are cached with typical file names structured
as size=100x100size_mode=4.jfif indi-
cating that it is an expanded menu previewed
file which has been cached, and therefore files
cached with this name can be attributed to
this form of Dropbox activity. When the
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browser cache is parsed, the cached file’s as-
sociated URL contains the file’s original file-
name; therefore, it is possible to identify the
filename given to the file by the user, which
has been cached.
Figure 4. An example expanded preview on
the Dropbox Homepage.
3.1.3 ‘Files’ View
When a user navigates to the ’Files’ page
(which lists all files in the user’s Drop-
box account) in their Dropbox account (a
URL of https://www.dropbox.com/home is
recorded in the address bar and Internet his-
tory), a home.html file is cached denoting the
structure of the ‘Files’ Dropbox page. When
attempting to determine the contents of this
page, the event_type parenthesis contains
information regarding each item shown to
be in the Dropbox account onscreen, with
a typical structure shown below. Figure 5
demonstrates how this metadata is visually
linked to a typical Dropbox page.
{\"event_type\": 1, \"beacon_context\"
:"AAB8jgVq6lHPiMD6YF4zX8v44x_N2V
WkQ8M\",\"href\":\"//www.dropbox.c
om/pri/get/Fig\%204.png?_subject_uid
=1023627536\\u0026w=AAAEDd5K1Al-
duuO9ccAm_1evI1KPlpnJ1brSTb14RZ8v
Q\",\"is_dir\":false,\"thumbnail_url_tm
pl\":\"https://photos.dropbox.com/t/2
/AABriBxPofqyc7onrTIpCz8jC4Rngx2eg
mWGaTv398FafA/12/1023627536/png
/32x32/1/_/1/9/Fig\%204.png/EKCxq9
oKGDUgAigC/BHWu3g9fdmJx3Q8jvCrer
6wyjxqgFwqz8aGQqcJOJIgtK_P3ZoDGQ
7i28B7mUqml1uRWaj91cg0ufX5_orq8
B2MM4nX2bTqQD5jRmYf2g4S15VSRpE
wPmjJ4Wto6ewHcOLc?size=32x32\\u0
026size_mode=1\", \"is_cloud_doc\":
false, \"is_in_team_folder_tree\":false
, \"user_id\": 1023627536, \"fq_path\":
\"/Fig4.png\",\"ts\":1530266052,\"previ
ew_type\": \"photo\", \"sjid\": 47, \"
size\":\"13.08KB\",\"type\":1,\"ns_p
ath\":\"/Fig4.png\",\"direct_blockser
ver_link\":\"//dleb.dropbox.com/get/F
ig\%204.png?_subject_uid=1023627536\
\u0026w=AAAEDd5K1Al-duuO9ccAm_1evI1KP
lpnJ1brSTb14RZ8vQ\",\"sort_key\":[\"
Mzk1BA8GCEdDNQENAdwMAA==\"], \"is_unm
ounted\": false,\"file_id\":\"id:1go4O
NUabqAAAAAAAAAAQw\", \"is_symlink\":
false, \"icon\": \"page_white_picture_
32\", \"ago\": \"29/6/201810:54\",\"by
tes\": 13399,\"
preview_url\":\"https://photo
s-6.dropbox.com/t/2/AABriBxPofqyc7o
nrTIpCz8jC4Rngx2egmWGaTv398FafA/
12/1023627536/png/32x32/1/_/1/9/Fi
g\%204.png/EKCxq9oKGDUgAigC/BHW
u3g9fdmJx3Q8jvCrer6wyjxqgFwqz8aG
QqcJOJIgtK_P3ZoDGQ7i28B7mUqml1u
RWaj91cg0ufX5_orq8B2MM4nX2bTqQ
D5jRmYf2g4S15VSRpEwPmjJ4Wto6ew
HcOLc?preserve_transparency=1\\u00
26size=32x32\\u0026size_mode=1\",
\"ext\":\".png\",\"revision_id\":
\"2fab4ad8a0\", \"ns_id\": 287380
9056\}
3.1.4 Viewing an Individual File
When an individual picture file is viewed
from within Dropbox (for example, a picture
is clicked upon expanding the user’s view of
it as shown in Figure 6), this previewed file is
cached by the browser with a filename struc-
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Figure 5. An example of a typical ’Files’
Dropbox page indicating which metadata is
cached.
ture of size=32x32size_mode=5.jfif.
Files with this naming structure can be
attributed to the act of viewing an individual
file on Dropbox. As noted above, with the
caching of expandable menu previewed files,
the cached file’s associated URL maintains
the original file name of the cached image,
which the user has attributed to this file
on the Dropbox account (for example,
www.dropbox.com/home?preview=FILEN\
\AME.png. Metadata regarding individually
viewed files is cached in a text file which
the following testing has the following
naming convention where %2FFILENAME
reflects the name of the file on Dropbox, and
therefore, metadata can be correlated to it -
is_xhr=trueactivity_context=3activity_con
text_data=%2 FFILENAME.txt. This file
is typically structured as follows:-
{"status": "ok", "payload": {"can_edit
_feedback": true, "resolved_comment_co
unt": 0, "feedback_off": false, "users
_to_notify": [{"dbx_account_id": "dbid
:AADHAYZBkFdb6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y"
, "initials_url": "https://ac.dropboxs
tatic.com/account_photo/get_initials?
initials=GJ\u0026size=64x64\u0026vers
=0", "id": 1023627536, "photo_url":
null, "display_name": "Grey Joy", "
lname": "Joy", "role": "personal",
"photo_circle_url": null, "fname": "Gr
ey", "email": "", "unique_id": "dbid:
AADHAYZBkFdb6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y"}]
, "latest_revision": {"direct_blockse
rver_link": null, "rev_owner": null,
"preview_link": null, "when": 152777
1969.0, "revision_id": "BHX_hi0zgCXy
4-p6eC24vvjrGN5PLYSOlDs
Bmq7FVv3yMmUF6ZoTN4RE3d2VRQpkO_rcrLw
GthE79-hPoSieEdeZhdkY0hjD5gBUwiAvWcFN
xfSHCBgRpPxSlL4X2mMH1mo"}, "file_icon
": "page_white_picture", "owner": {"d
bx_account_id": "dbid:AADHAYZBkFdb6Wk
H63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y", "initials_url"
: "", "email": "", "lname": "", "role"
: "personal", "photo_circle_url": null
, "fname": "", "display_name": "", "id
": 1023627536, "unique_id": "dbid:AADH
AYZBkFdb6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y", "ph
oto_url": null}, "is_dir": false, "fq
_path": "/Fig 5.png", "when_milli":
1527771969000, "comment_activity_dicts
": [], "name": "Fig 5.png", "context_
data": "/Fig 5.png", "when": 15277719
69, "actor": {"dbx_account_id": "dbid:
AADHAYZBkFdb6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y",
"initials_url":
Figure 6. A demonstration of an individual
file preview showing comment information
and file metadata.
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A Dropbox user can also comment on
the files they have uploaded to their ac-
count, and in turn, if the file has been
shared with another user, they can also
make comments. When comments are made
(shown in Figure 6), the s\_xhr=true&
actvity_cont=3activity_context_data=
%2FFILENA-
ME.txt file maintains addition "comment":
tags. Examples of comments and comment
metadata are provided below.
"comment": {"resolved": false,
"comment_meta_json": null,
"comment_text": "LOTS OF COMMENT TEXT",
"client_id": null, "when_mses":
1530907487537, "commenter_dict":
{"dbx_account_id":
"dbid:AADHAYZBkF
db6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y",
"initials_url":
"https://ac.dropboxstatic.com
/account_photo
/get_initials?initials
=GJ\u0026size=64x64
\u0026vers=0", "id": 1023627536,
"photo_url": null, "display_name":
"Grey Joy", "lname": "Joy", "role":
"personal", "photo_circle_url": null,
"fname": "Grey", "email": "",
"unique_id": "dbid:AADHAYZBkF
db6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y"},
"comment_gid":
"c365OFsrDbAAAAAAAAAABg",
"when": 1530907487,
"reply_to_activity_key":
null, "raw_comment_text":
"LOTS OF COMMENT TEXT"},
Comments can be replied to directly by a
third party account where the original owner
of the file directly links their account to
a comment. Where a third party replies,
display_name, lname and fname tags will
reflect the third party’s account details. No
email address information is available for
the third party commenter, and the "id":
tag does not maintain the account holder’s
unique id, rather the value is typically set to
0. As a result, while a 3rd party account can
be partially identified, it may not be possi-
ble to identify the actual account (or submit
a disclosure request to Dropbox) if account
name metadata has been changed
3.1.5 File Sharing and Deleted Files
Each Dropbox account also has a ’Sharing’
page (visits to this page generate the URL
https://www.dropbox.com/share in the In-
ternet history), which depicts the files and
folders which have been shared with the user’s
account. When a user interacts with this
page, following an examination of the cache,
no records of the page content and shared files
could be located. Similarly, Dropbox main-
tains deleted files for 30 days where a user
can view and restore this content. No records
attributable to deleted file records could be
identified in the browser cache during test
visits to the deleted files pages. As a result,
the browser cache is unlikely to provide any
records of content from a user account that
has been deleted or shared.
4. GOOGLE DRIVE
Section 4 provides an analysis of ‘Google
Drive’, a cloud storage service comparable to
that of Dropbox. Those who have a Google
account also have access to Google’s cloud
storage facility ‘Google Drive,’ and at the
time of writing, Google offers 15 GB of stor-
age free to account holders. Forensic analysis
of Google Drive demonstrates that despite
being a comparative platform to Dropbox,
the behavior of this service within the web
browser cache presents a greater challenge to
those seeking to investigate the usage of cloud
storage accounts of this type. In contrast to
Dropbox analysis, the Chrome browser cache
retains limited information depicting a user’s
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interaction with their Google Drive account
with the remainder of this section demon-
strating this.
As a starting point for analysis, the Google
Drive Home screen is examined. The Home
URL for a Google Drive visit is structured
as https://drive.google.com/drive/my-
drive with Figure 7 depicting the Home
screen site structure.
The ‘My Drive’ link documents a scrollable
list of all contents within the Google Drive
account. Unlike Dropbox, on-landing, site
strutal .html content is not locally cached,
and therefore no metadata regarding stored
files visible to the user onscreen can be ex-
tracted and examined from the browser cache
(unlike Dropbox). As a result, from the cache
alone, testing indicated that is was not pos-
sible to ascertain the names and associated
metadata of content stored in the account.
While this, compared to Dropbox, is a lim-
iting factor for practitioners who are tasked
with a cloud storage account investigation,
some image caching does occur. The Google
Drive Home screen maintains two types of
thumbnail image, ‘Quick Access’ (files typi-
cally cached with a file name of w300-k) and
‘File List’ thumbnails (files typically cached
with a file name of w32-h32-p-k-nu) (shown
in Figure 7). Following testing, no user as-
signed and attributable file name information
was available.
An examination of all files cached (cache
content was captured using Nirsoft’s (2018)
’ChromeCacheView v1.77’ and keyword
searched for file names (uniquely attributed
to test data) and associated onscreen visi-
ble metadata) following a visit to the Google
Drive Home screen failed to identify file re-
lated metadata of cloud storage content. This
indicates that Google Drive account meta-
data content is not cached on the local de-
vice.
The URL associated with Google Drive ac-
tivity also offers limited information. When
Figure 7. The Google Drive Home screen
structure.
an image is previewed from the Home screen,
the URL does not change (it remains - https:
//drive.google.com/drive/my-drive.
However, previewed images are cached with
a typical file name of w1366-h662), meaning
analysis of Internet history is unlikely to
reveal significant information regarding
account content. When a user navigates
to a folder they have created within their
account; the URL is typically structured
as https://drive.google.com/drive/
folders/0By-CihkhmywOek1Gak4ySlhnQkk.
The bolded section appears encoded and
does not change when the folder is renamed,
indicating that it is unlikely to hold obfus-
cated folder name information. As a result,
an analysis of internet history is unlikely to
reveal account usage behavior.
Google Drive is also part of Google’s suite
of tools offered to a Google account holder,
where a user who has files of the type that
can be placed under the umbrella term of
‘office documents’, can automatically utilize
Google Slides, Docs, and Sheets to open, view
and edit them. When a user selects an of-
fice document of any type and is directed to
an appropriate Google facility (either Docs,
Sheets or Slides), testing showed that the
content of these documents is not cached by
Chrome (following extraction of the Chrome
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cache and the utilization of keyword and file
carving techniques).
5. RESULTS AND
CONCLUDING
THOUGHTS
The use of cloud storage facilities now means
that digital forensic practitioners face an in-
creased likelihood that localized forms of data
storage may not contain all of a user’s owned
and potentially evidentiary digital content.
Whilst procedures are in place to request
account content disclosure from a service
provider and to seek account credentials for
future access; such methods are not a guar-
anteed way of establishing access to a user’s
account (see, for example, Google’s (2017)
Transparency Report documenting acts of
compliance to requests and disclosure of ac-
count data). It is key to note that often a
request for account access must be made fol-
lowing some form of a reasonable belief that
content within the account may be relevant to
an investigation where measures are often in
place both jurisdictionally and in the terms of
service of many providers to protect a user’s
privacy in the context of using such services.
Acquiring such reasonable belief requires an
investigation of the surrounding facts of a
case and information available to an investi-
gator, of which one key source (dependent on
the platform in use) may be that of the Inter-
net browser cache. Localized forms of cached
cloud storage activity have been overlooked
by current academic research in digital foren-
sics and cloud storage investigations. Yet,
testing demonstrated in this article reveals
that the act of accessing Dropbox via the
Chrome web browser leads to what can be
arguably considered comprehensive caching
of their account content and its associated
metadata. While the same level of caching
was not witnessed with Google Drive, testing
demonstrates that even though the value of
the browser cache in cloud storage investiga-
tions varies depending upon the service in use
by a suspect, it should not be wholly disre-
garded as a source of potentially evidentiary
information. Subject to the deletion of cache
content (either through a browser’s inbuilt
cleaning features or via 3rd party deletion ap-
plications), cached content may influence law
enforcement decision making as to whether
to pursue a potentially time consuming and
costly disclosure request to a service provider.
5.1 A Comparison of Platform
Results
As each platform displays different caching
behavior, it is necessary to offer the following
breakdown of recoverable cached data as a
result of the use of each service.
Dropbox:
File Listings: Information regarding files
listed in the user’s Dropbox account, includ-
ing any files within sub-folders, can be recov-
ered from cached content. This includes not
only file names assigned by the user but also
timestamp information.
Images: Both thumbnail images and pre-
viewed images are cached.
Account information: Metadata, including
account holder information, email, and ac-
count identification, can all be retrieved from
cached .html files denoting the Dropbox ac-
count site’s structure.
File Comment information: Where a
comment has been left on a file within
the Dropbox account, comment content is
cached.
Descriptive Internet History: Where a
user accesses folders on their account, the
URL denotes the file and folder names asso-
ciated with this content (for example- www.
dropbox.com/home/TESTFOLDERNAME).
Google Drive:
Images: Both thumbnail images and pre-
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viewed images are cached.
Despite a difference in the volume of content
cached between both services, it is critical to
note that in both cases caching in some form
does take place and therefore offers some use
to a practitioner examining a device. Par-
ticularly as noted in Section 1, where cloud
storage providers have been utilized to store
IDCSA when a user visits their account, test-
ing suggests that image caching of viewable
content (see Horsman (2018d) for a discus-
sion of the browser cache and viewable con-
tent onscreen) including preview thumbnails
will occur on both platforms. In such cases,
this may be enough for an examination to
identify that an account holds potentially rel-
evant information providing that they can
attribute the cached files to an act of viewing
a cloud storage account through the browser.
This should be achievable by examining the
chronological timings of Internet history and,
as noted above, acknowledging files with the
naming conventions previously highlighted
and acknowledging that these have come from
a cached cloud storage account visit.
5.2 Limitations and Future
Work
Chrome remains a reported market-leading
Internet browser and, therefore, a chosen tar-
get of this work (Statista, 2018b). The re-
sults depicted may be transferable to other
web browsing applications, where further test-
ing is required, but due to the exhaustive
number of services and browser platforms, it
was not feasible to achieve this within this
work. As a result, this work provides an en-
try analysis into this form of investigation to
inform practitioners of the potential presence
of such content and to incorporate this within
their investigation processes. The depiction
of cached cloud storage content is also subject
to changes over time, and as cloud service
providers update and adapt their platform, el-
ements may no longer be cached locally, or in
some cases, additional content may be cached.
As a result, cache analysis in this context is
a moving target with multiple variables that
may impact the success of determining how
someone is using their account. This work has
demonstrated that caching of cloud storage
artifacts can occur, and therefore it is argued
that the browser cache should not be disre-
garded when investigations of this type are
being undertaken. Future work must involve
the sustained research of Internet browser
cache behavior in this context, incorporating
both different browser platforms.
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